Recipe for saving a 'Dying Kingdom' |
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By Dr. B.A. Hussainmiya
(Part IV - Series on Why Brunei
accepted the British Protection in 1906)
McArthur was by no means
a yes-man. Himself a son of a general, he possessed the best credentials and
strength of character to speak his mind out. First, he aimed his salvo at his
own bosses.
"When it is
remembered that these evils flourish under nominal British protection, and
that it is that protection alone which keeps Brunei in existence as a
separate State, it seems obligatory on His Majesty's government to take some
steps to ameliorate them"
It was a verdict on
the failing of his own government for not giving the real and promised
protection to Brunei. He needed the recipe or a formula to reprieve 'a dying
kingdom' (labelled by Hugh Clifford in the MacMillan's Magazine, 1902)
instead of pushing it further to the brink of extinction as many of his
colleagues loved to do.
Originally intended to
last only three months, McArthur's mission was extended by a further three
months' period from June to August 1904 due to a deadly outbreak of small-pox
epidemic costing many lives in the capital. The old Sultan, though escaped the
illness, was 'very infirm' caused by a minor accident when the timber floor
of his palace caved in due to rotting nibong
stumps underneath.
All the while,
McArthur was expected to keep the objectives of his mission a total secret
from the locals for Brunei (town) people had become highly agitated about
their future. In any case, a Consul was not supposed to dabble in the
internal affairs of the State. Besides, there were spies of the Rajah
especially inside the palace to tip off the movements of his nemesis -
McArthur. Diplomatically he brought three Malays from the peninsula, who
accompanied him on his earlier mission to Kelantan the previous year, to help
him in Brunei as they would be more acceptable than Europeans to gain the
trust and confidence of the local people. And before long, he knew what ailed
Brunei condemned in the Brooke circle 'as a blot on civilisation and a canker
in the heart of Sarawak.'
Apparently, there were
attempts to use the grievances of a few mistreated Chinese traders as casus belli for a Sarawak takeover of
Brunei. In the past the Consuls had brought gunboats aiming at the palace to
require compliance from the Sultan to return the alleged loans to the traders
owed by his pengirans. It is pertinent to mention that I recently discovered
an interesting document of 1846 among the East India Company Records in the
New Delhi Archives urging the British to invade Brunei because the then
Sultan, Omar Ali Saifuddin II, had defaulted on a payment to an Eurasian
couple!
McArthur did not want
to repeat a similar stunt to punish collectively the Sultan and his people.
On the contrary, he urged London not take the Chinese traders' grouses too
seriously, because in his view, if anybody, it was they, taking risks
knowingly in an unsettled country, who stood to benefit most by earning
massive profits out of the financial incompetence of the rulers and their
dependence upon foreign traders. As money-lenders they obtained mortgages on
the revenues of Brunei for many years ahead. The inhabitants in the capital
too were in distress as these traders had been jacking up prices at their
will of consumer goods - virtually all imports - as they held the monopoly
and acted as middlemen.
For McArthur, Sultan
Hashim was not the villain, but rather a victim accused of trumped up charges
of misrule, among other things, for his inaction to compensate the losses of
some Chinese traders, most of whom were registered British subjects, nearly
500 of them at the time. While admiring them for their thrift and industry,
McArthur referred to them as aliens and not the real inhabitants of the
country whose cupidity was "one of the main causes of the distress and
poverty prevalent in Brunei." His remarks were bad enough but little did
he realise that his Government would abandon their obligation later even to
the genuine Chinese settlers in the sultanate.
The Consul's harshest
words, however, were reserved for the recalcitrant noble class of Brunei.
Like the nobility in the medieval Europe, many led an indolent life, whose
alleged rapine and cruelty were attributed to the Sultan. The latter was
helpless because of the country's curious traditional constitution that
rendered him powerless as his status was nothing but a primus inter pares - first among the
equals. It must be noted that Sultan Hashim once complained that his
authority did not extend beyond the Brunei River around which his palace was
situated. McArthur pointed his finger at the nobility as the most dangerous
and discontented among the population, some of whom lived off the earnings of
Kedayans and Bisayas, considered as industrious indigenous people. McArthur's
counsel was to curtail the privileges of the pengirans while bolstering the
authority of the Sultan as the supreme Ruler.
McArthur, however, was
not averse to the commoner Malays. More importantly, he demolished the myth
of lazy Malays often highlighted in British accounts; one which he read
lampooned the case of a Brunei Malay who cut down a coconut tree to get a
coconut. He questioned the ludicrous story as to how much labour this would
have cost that poor Malay. He found, on the other hand, the Brunei Malays
were willing to work hard given the right atmosphere as "in the face of
the work which they cheerfully perform day and night shifts in the Cutch factory
and in their daily avocations such as sea fishing."
Finally McArthur
turned around the argument of people like Brooke, Hewett and others who
persisted in saying that that Brunei would submit only to the Sarawak rule.
McArthur, in fact, was flabbergasted by the intense opposition and dislike of
the Rajah by people of all walks of life in Brunei. A criminal usurper of
their lands, he was resented for terrorising the people through the Iban
levies. Of course, if the Rajah willed and acted, going by the past examples,
there was nothing Brunei could do to stop him.
In the circumstances,
McArthur emphasised that the British Government had a clear obligation to act
decisively, one way or another. If not this would "only postpone for a
short time the final loss of Brunei independence and in the meantime to
increase the sufferings of the inhabitants of the State, while encouraging
the squandering of all its resources."
The alternative was
not to turn Brunei over to the White Rajah, who was personally despotic, and
the British North Borneo Company, a white elephant, nor to a British Consul
on the spot, who would have had no means of enforcing his advice and thereby
would quickly lose prestige.
The best option,
therefore in McArthur's view, was to introduce a British Residency. Despite
limiting the executive authority of the monarch, it was by far the 'less
obnoxious' choice than for the Bruneians to lose their Sultan and their Jati Diri, the much touted Bruneian
identity. Never before was a British Officer so forthright in his opinions
that the British Government finally listened to help the Brunei throne. To be continued
(The writer is an Associate Professor of History at
Universiti Brunei Darussalam. He can be contacted by e-mail;
hmiya@fass.ubd.edu.bn)
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Recipe for saving a 'Dying Kingdom'
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By Dr. B.A. Hussainmiya
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The Chinese itinerant traders selling their merchandise in boats to the Brunei Town residents in Kampong Ayer, c. 1920s. Courtesy: Brunei History Centre |
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The Residence/Office Quarters of the British Consuls, c. 1898. Courtesy: Brunei History Centre |
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(Part IV - Series on Why Brunei
accepted the British Protection in 1906)
McArthur was by no means a yes-man. Himself a son of
a general, he possessed the best credentials and strength of character to
speak his mind out. First, he aimed his salvo at his own bosses.
"When it is remembered that these evils
flourish under nominal British protection, and that it is that protection
alone which keeps Brunei in existence as a separate State, it seems
obligatory on His Majesty's government to take some steps to ameliorate
them"
It was a verdict on the failing of his own
government for not giving the real and promised protection to Brunei. He
needed the recipe or a formula to reprieve 'a dying kingdom' (labelled by
Hugh Clifford in the MacMillan's Magazine, 1902) instead of pushing it
further to the brink of extinction as many of his colleagues loved to do.
Originally intended to last only three months,
McArthur's mission was extended by a further three months' period from June
to August 1904 due to a deadly outbreak of small-pox epidemic costing many
lives in the capital. The old Sultan, though escaped the illness, was 'very
infirm' caused by a minor accident when the timber floor of his palace caved
in due to rotting nibong stumps
underneath.
All the while, McArthur was expected to keep the
objectives of his mission a total secret from the locals for Brunei (town)
people had become highly agitated about their future. In any case, a Consul
was not supposed to dabble in the internal affairs of the State. Besides,
there were spies of the Rajah especially inside the palace to tip off the
movements of his nemesis - McArthur. Diplomatically he brought three Malays
from the peninsula, who accompanied him on his earlier mission to Kelantan
the previous year, to help him in Brunei as they would be more acceptable
than Europeans to gain the trust and confidence of the local people. And
before long, he knew what ailed Brunei condemned in the Brooke circle 'as a
blot on civilisation and a canker in the heart of Sarawak.'
Apparently, there were attempts to use the
grievances of a few mistreated Chinese traders as casus belli for a Sarawak takeover of Brunei. In the past
the Consuls had brought gunboats aiming at the palace to require compliance from
the Sultan to return the alleged loans to the traders owed by his pengirans.
It is pertinent to mention that I recently discovered an interesting document
of 1846 among the East India Company Records in the New Delhi Archives urging
the British to invade Brunei because the then Sultan, Omar Ali Saifuddin II,
had defaulted on a payment to an Eurasian couple!
McArthur did not want to repeat a similar stunt to
punish collectively the Sultan and his people. On the contrary, he urged London
not take the Chinese traders' grouses too seriously, because in his view, if
anybody, it was they, taking risks knowingly in an unsettled country, who
stood to benefit most by earning massive profits out of the financial
incompetence of the rulers and their dependence upon foreign traders. As
money-lenders they obtained mortgages on the revenues of Brunei for many
years ahead. The inhabitants in the capital too were in distress as these
traders had been jacking up prices at their will of consumer goods -
virtually all imports - as they held the monopoly and acted as middlemen.
For McArthur, Sultan Hashim was not the villain, but
rather a victim accused of trumped up charges of misrule, among other things,
for his inaction to compensate the losses of some Chinese traders, most of
whom were registered British subjects, nearly 500 of them at the time. While
admiring them for their thrift and industry, McArthur referred to them as
aliens and not the real inhabitants of the country whose cupidity was "one
of the main causes of the distress and poverty prevalent in Brunei." His
remarks were bad enough but little did he realise that his Government would
abandon their obligation later even to the genuine Chinese settlers in the
sultanate.
The Consul's harshest words, however, were reserved
for the recalcitrant noble class of Brunei. Like the nobility in the medieval
Europe, many led an indolent life, whose alleged rapine and cruelty were
attributed to the Sultan. The latter was helpless because of the country's
curious traditional constitution that rendered him powerless as his status
was nothing but a primus inter pares - first
among the equals. It must be noted that Sultan Hashim once complained that
his authority did not extend beyond the Brunei River around which his palace
was situated. McArthur pointed his finger at the nobility as the most
dangerous and discontented among the population, some of whom lived off the
earnings of Kedayans and Bisayas, considered as industrious indigenous
people. McArthur's counsel was to curtail the privileges of the pengirans
while bolstering the authority of the Sultan as the supreme Ruler.
McArthur, however, was not averse to the commoner
Malays. More importantly, he demolished the myth of lazy Malays often
highlighted in British accounts; one which he read lampooned the case of a
Brunei Malay who cut down a coconut tree to get a coconut. He questioned the
ludicrous story as to how much labour this would have cost that poor Malay.
He found, on the other hand, the Brunei Malays were willing to work hard
given the right atmosphere as "in the face of the work which they
cheerfully perform day and night shifts in the Cutch factory and in their
daily avocations such as sea fishing."
Finally McArthur turned around the argument of
people like Brooke, Hewett and others who persisted in saying that that
Brunei would submit only to the Sarawak rule. McArthur, in fact, was
flabbergasted by the intense opposition and dislike of the Rajah by people of
all walks of life in Brunei. A criminal usurper of their lands, he was
resented for terrorising the people through the Iban levies. Of course, if
the Rajah willed and acted, going by the past examples, there was nothing
Brunei could do to stop him.
In the circumstances, McArthur emphasised that the
British Government had a clear obligation to act decisively, one way or
another. If not this would "only postpone for a short time the final
loss of Brunei independence and in the meantime to increase the sufferings of
the inhabitants of the State, while encouraging the squandering of all its
resources."
The alternative was not to turn Brunei over to the
White Rajah, who was personally despotic, and the British North Borneo
Company, a white elephant, nor to a British Consul on the spot, who would have
had no means of enforcing his advice and thereby would quickly lose prestige.
The best option, therefore in McArthur's view, was
to introduce a British Residency. Despite limiting the executive authority of
the monarch, it was by far the 'less obnoxious' choice than for the Bruneians
to lose their Sultan and their Jati Diri,
the much touted Bruneian identity. Never before was a British Officer so
forthright in his opinions that the British Government finally listened to
help the Brunei throne. To be continued
(The writer is an
Associate Professor of History at Universiti Brunei Darussalam. He can be
contacted by e-mail; hmiya@fass.ubd.edu.bn)
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Monday, April 4, 2016
Recipe for saving a 'Dying Kingdom'
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